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Abstract: Governmental decisions play an important role in the critical periods of the economy and 
usually in base of the strategy adopted, can make an effective contribution to the budget process while 
preserving fiscal discipline. This study tests the implications of fiscal responsibility on economic 
growth with the scope to analyze and find out the major issue of responsible public finances. In base of 
logistic regression results, the study leads to the conclusion that may be wise to re-evaluate plans to cut 
net government revenue in future budgets and instead take a more strategic approach to nurturing 
growth in the EU  economy. 
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1. Introduction  
Many decisions involve “temporal dilemmas”, that is conflicts between the 
immediate and delayed consequences of one’s actions. In the same way, 
governmental decision, have a direct impact on the standard of life and economic 
stability of entire populations, being very important that this decisions to have like 
support a solid strategy, a good management and a solid legal framework. We find 
also like argue that fiscal, or budgetary transparency has large, positive effects on 
fiscal performance (James, Dreyer, 2002, p. 141). 
There are a lot of people who believe that fiscal responsibility, a concept who 
involves transparency, efficiency of public administration and care for future 
generations by improving sustainable development, has large and positive effects on 
fiscal performance. According to the IMF, “transparency in government operations 
is widely regarded as an important precondition for macroeconomic fiscal 
sustainability, good governance, and overall fiscal rectitude” (Kopits & Craig, 1998, 
                                                     
1 Assistant Professor, PhD Candidate, Department of Finance, Money and Public 
Administration, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iasi, Romania, Address: Bulevardul 
Carol I 11, Iasi 700506, Romania, Corresponding author: gavriluta.anca@yаhoo.com. 
AUDŒ, Vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 55-65 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                     Vol 13, no 2, 2017 
 56 
p. 1). However, while such asserted effects are common, there is not much empirical 
evidence about institutional transparency and fiscal policy outcomes. Some links 
appear between fiscal transparency and fiscal performance in European countries, 
and between indirect measures of transparency and fiscal performance in Latin 
American countries. Many remain convinced of the importance of fiscal policy, 
unrealised the role of consolidate a series of principles to guide to the way of public 
health finance and care for future generations. 
Ewijk and Casper (2006), relate that healthy public finances contribute to 
macroeconomic stability and support monetary policy in maintaining stable prices at 
low interest rates. Both effects are conducive to private investment and savings. On 
the other hand, by reducing public debt and the interest burden, this also creates room 
for a reduction in distortionary taxes and an increase in productive public spending 
(Wong, Christine, 2000, p. 55). The theoretical literature on the causes and 
consequences of fiscal, or budgetary, responsibility and transparency is not large 
(Rogoff, 1990). From a theoretical point of view, Shi and Svensson (2002) 
emphasizing that voters want more competent politicians in office, as they can 
provide more public goods for given levels of taxation and private consumption. In 
this way, besides issues related to the theory of public choice (Buchanan, Musgrave, 
1999 p. 16), a theory widely treated by economists consecrated in the field, more 
important is the citizens' trust in the representatives of the central level.  From other 
studies, results on deficit and debt accumulation: that transparency decreases debt 
accumulation, at least partly through an effect on the electoral cycle (Shi & 
Svensson, 2002), that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation1. 
The economic and financial crisis badly weakened public finances in EU countries 
and significant efforts in recent years and an improved economic outlook are bearing 
fruit and Member States have succeeded in reducing deficits and stabilising debt 
levels. The purpose of this paper is to tests the implications of fiscal responsibility 
on economic growth  with the scope to analyze and find out the major issue of 
responsible public finances. In base of logistic regression we want to offer an opinion 
on the specifics of fiscal responsibility, in order to predict GDP growth in the nature 
of tax rules (rules that based on own specific content, summarizes compliance with 
fiscal responsability of the budget). 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
The methodology used is quantitative, based on the use of logistic regression, wich 
in contrast to the multiple linear regression, where you can predict, based on several 
independent variables, a numeric dependent variable, logistic regression allows 
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predicting a dichotomous nominal variables. Linear regression method assumes that 
both factorial variables and variable the result is the continuous type; by contrast, 
logistic regression allows working other types of variables. Logistic regression 
model describe the relationship between a dichotomous variable Y, which takes 
values 1 (Success) and 0 (failure), and k factorial variables 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3…..𝑥𝑘. Thus, 
we can focused to analysis the influence of variables on GDP growth, wanting to 
show the implications of fiscal responsibility on administrative work and indirectly, 
on economic growth. 
A detailed presentation of logistic regression methodology and of the issues raised 
by its use was performed by Amemiya, T. (1985), Balakrishnan, N. (1991), Hosmer, 
David W.; Stanley Lemeshow (2000), Agresti, Alan (2002) and Green, William H. 
(2003). In this study, the dependent variables is: GDP growth, encoded in the 
analysis with 1 and 0-average under 2.27 = 0, over 2.27 = 1 and independent 
variables are: Total fiscal rules, Public Debt, Total revenue, Total fiscal pressure, 
Total general expenditure, GDP growth, Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-). 
The variables considered in the logistic regression model are: 
 Dependent variable (Y) – GDPgr (real GDP growth) – converted 
numerical variable in dummy variable- categorical: it resorted to calculating 
the average, was established as follows: 0 = average under 2.27 over 2.27 = 
1. 
 Independent variables (Xj):  
- X1 -Tfr (Total fiscal rules);  
- X2-Bl (Legal basis of fiscal rules); 
- X3-Tec (Type of economy). 
By placing all variables used in the analysis of any nature whatsoever final logistic 
regression model used in the analysis is as follows: 
log (
𝑝
1
− 𝑝)𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑓𝑟 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑙 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑐 
 
3. Results and Discussions 
Statistical description of the evariables used in the analysis is shown in Appendix. 
no 1. It can be seen that the data set is complete quantitative variables, which each 
have a set of 28 records. Analysis of indicators aimed at central tendency, 
exemplified through the media, reveals that the average value: -1.50 GDP growth is 
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due to negative values in some countries such as Cyprus, Finland and Croatia, the 
tax rules 2.00, 10.70 Public debt, total revenues, 33.60, 26 fiscal pressure, total 
expenditure, 34.4 and deficit, surplus, 8.50 due to the preponderance of deficits 
values in 28 countries. 
Standard deviation analysis highlights the following issues: 
 total sales tax rules is one less dispersed, which varies from the average level 
of 1.16553% positively or negatively. We can say that 68.2% of the total tax 
rules fall between ± σ x ̅ respectively ± 1.6553% 3.3929%; 
 distribution of public debt is very dispersed that vary from the average level 
of 39.16905% of GDP positively and negatively. We can say that 68.2% of 
the total public debt distribution is between ± σ x ̅ respectively 74.2643 ± 
39.16905% of GDP; 
  total income distribution is one less dispersed, which varies from the 
average level of 6.62096% positively or negatively. We can say that 68.2% 
of the total income is between ± σ x ̅ ie 43.1679% ± 6.62096;  
 distribution of total fiscal pressure is one less dispersed that vary from the 
average level of 0.06395% positively and negatively. We can say that 68.2% 
of the total fiscal pressure is between ± σ x ̅ 0.3618 ± 0.006395% 
respectively;  
 distribution of government spending is one less dispersed, which varies from 
the average level of 6.52418% of GDP positively or negatively. We can say 
that 68.2% of the total of private saving is between ± σ x ̅ respectively 
46.1750 ± 6.52418% of GDP; 
 distribution Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-).is one less dispersed, which 
varies from the average level of 2.49549% of GDP positively or negatively. 
We can say that 68.2% of the total of private saving is between ± σ x  ̅
respectively ± 2.49549 -2.49549% of GDP; 
Analysis of form distribution reveals that shape distributions for four of quantitative 
variables are asymmetric to the right since the coefficient of asymmetry Perason 𝛽1 
is greater than zero 𝛽1 > 0 for all distributions respectively: 0.052 for fiscal rules, 
0805 for public debt, 0.365 for total revenue, 0,283 the tax burden, 1222. 
Logistic Regression Results 
Table Case Processing Summary (Appendix 2.) shows that there are 28 records used 
in the analysis 0while Table Dependent Variables Codings highlights that are 
specific codes for dummy variable, with 0 being denoted countries with a growth 
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rate of GDP less than 2.27 to 1, those average over 2.27. Appendix 3. Classification 
Table, shows that there are 14 countries that have a GDP growth rate of less than 
2.27, another 14 have rates above 2.27. It notes that the model fails to predict a 
probability of 57.5%. 
Table 1. Variables not in the Equation 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables TRF 1.287 1 .257 
Bazalegala .206 1 .650 
Tipuleconomiei 2.800 1 .094 
Overall Statistics 5.177 3 .159 
Source: own calculations using SPSS 
In this table - Variables not in the Equation are presented variables that were 
not used in the initial stage forecasting logistic regression (Block 0), respectively: 
Type fiscal rules, the legal basis, the type of economy and value Sig. It shows how 
strongly influenced model as if it were introduced. 
Table 2. Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 5.745 3 .125 
Block 5.745 3 .125 
Model 5.745 3 .125 
Source: own calculations using SPSS 
 Hypothesis testing 
H0: invalid model (independent variables have no influence on the dependent 
variable); 
H1: The model is valid (independent variables have influence on the dependent 
variable). 
 Significance step: α = 0.05; 
 Establishing the rule of decision: If sig ≥ α not reject the hypothesis 
H0 &If sig < α reject the hypothesis H0; 
 Interpretation of results. 
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Omnibus test, shows that Sig = 0.12> α = 0.05, so the null hypothesis is accepted, 
the introduction of the model variables excluded in the preliminary stage 
significantly altered our ability to predict GDP growth based on the critical nature 
fiscale. Since the critical value = 0.125 Sig I can say with a 1% risk assumed that the 
model is statistically significant and its results can be used in predicting the 
dependent variable. 
Table 3. Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square Df Sig. 
1 5.433 7 .607 
Source: own calculations using SPSS 
 Hypothesis testing 
 H0: There is a good connection between the model and the data recorded; 
 H1: There isn't a good connection between the model and the data recorded. 
 Significance step: α = 0.05 
Establishing the rule of decision  
 If sig ≥ α not reject the hypothesis H0; 
 If sig < α rejected the hypothesis H0; 
 Interpretation of results 
Sig = 0.607 > α = 0.05 which shows that the null hypothesis is accepted. It can 
guarantee a 95% probability that there is a good correlation between the model and 
the data recorded. 
 
Table 4. Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
GDP growth = under 2.27 GDP growth = over 2.27 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 2 2.545 1 .455 3 
2 2 2.205 1 .795 3 
3 3 2.123 0 .877 3 
4 0 .516 1 .484 1 
5 3 2.382 2 2.618 5 
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6 1 1.395 2 1.605 3 
7 1 1.351 2 1.649 3 
8 2 1.064 2 2.936 4 
9 0 .420 3 2.580 3 
Classification Tablea 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 GDP growth Percentage 
Correct  Under  2.27 Over 2.27 
Step 1 GDP growth Under  2.27 7 7 50.0 
Over 2.27 3 11 78.6 
Overall Percentage   64.3 
a. The cut value is .500 
Source: Own calculations using SPSS 
Following the introduction of the logistic regression model of the independent 
variables, can be seen that the increased degree of accuracy estimation model from 
50.0% (baseline when it was included only constant) to a 64% by inclusion of 
independent variables the legal basis, such as fiscal rules, such as the economy. 
Table 5. Variables in the Equation 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Tfr -1.190 .820 2.107 1 .147 .304 
Legal base .045 .283 .025 1 .873 1.046 
Type of economy 2.087 1.112 3.522 1 .061 8.063 
Constant -.848 1.473 .331 1 .565 .428 
Source: Own calculations using SPSS 
The logistic regression model equation: E (Y/X) = π (x) = 
e−0.848 – 1.190 · X1+0.045 ·X2+2.087.X3
1+  e−0.848 – 1.190 · X1+0.045 ·X2+2.087.X3
. 
The estimate parameter β1 is set to -1.190. The negative value of this ratio shows 
that an increase of 1.0% fiscal rules, lowering the chances estimated growth rate of 
GDP is below the average of 0.5%. 
Table 6. Variables in the Equation 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant .000 .378 .000 1 1.000 1.000 
Source: Own calculations using SPSS 
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Table Variables in the Equation are presented probabilities of Wald test (Sig = 0.1). 
For independent variables considered in the analysis, the value of these probabilities 
is greater than the materiality threshold α (0.05), thus accepting the null hypothesis 
(H0: βj = 0). Basically, there is a good connection between the model and the data 
recorded. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The way in wich the state uses the mechanisms of public finances to counteract some 
disturbing phenomena of the economy, is a subject of intense debate and I would say 
there are many studies that test the connection between the state and public finance 
mechanisms, but few bring into discussion the importance of fiscal responsibility 
and accountability of governments. In other, on the occasion of establishment of the 
economic crisis and an ever increasing need for efficiency in using financial 
resources and support sustainable development, has become a need for regulation at 
EU level, with implications for Member States, which led to the consolidation of 
certain tax rules, all this having as finality the creation of public administration 
efficiency. 
The methodology is based on the use of logistic regression, wich in contrast to the 
multiple linear regression, where we can predict, based on several independent 
variables, a numeric dependent variable, logistic regression allows predicting a 
dichotomous nominal variables. Linear regression method assumes that both 
factorial variables and variable the result is the continuous type; by contrast, logistic 
regression allows working other types of variables. We had focused to analysis the 
influence of variables on GDP growth, and showed the implications of fiscal 
responsibility on administrative work and indirectly, on economic growth. 
In base of study results, Sig = 0.607 > α = 0.05 which shows that the null hypothesis 
is accepted. It can guarantee a 95% probability that there is a good correlation 
between the model and the data recorded. Following the introduction of the logistic 
regression model of the independent variables, can be seen that the increased degree 
of accuracy estimation model from 50.0% (baseline when it was included only 
constant) to a 64% by inclusion of independent variables the legal basis, such as 
fiscal rules, such as type of economy economy. Wald test (Sig = 0.1). For 
independent variables considered in the analysis, the value of these probabilities is 
greater than the materiality threshold α (0.05), thus accepting the null hypothesis 
(H0: βj = 0). Basically, there is a good connection between the model and the data 
recorded. 
Basically, the result of our study demonstrate that there are a lot of implications of 
fiscal responsibility on economic growth, because, in terms of transparency, care for 
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future generations and a legal framework capable to assured a solid systems of public 
finances, responsibility, resolve the major issue of responsible public finances.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. Statistical description of the e variables 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N 
Mini
mum 
Maxim
um Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic 
Statist
ic 
Statisti
c 
Statisti
c Statistic 
Statis
tic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Total fiscal 
rules 
28 2.00 5.00 3.3929 1.16553 .052 .441 -1.482 .858 
Public Debt 
28 10.70 179.70 
74.264
3 
39.16345 .805 .441 .726 .858 
Total revenue 
28 33.60 56.70 
43.167
9 
6.62096 .365 .441 -.759 .858 
Total fiscal 
pressure 
28 .26 .48 .3618 .06395 .283 .441 -.905 .858 
Total general 
expenditure 
28 34.40 58.10 
46.175
0 
6.52418 -.023 .441 -.773 .858 
GDP growth 28 -1.50 8.50 2.2714 2.28081 1.222 .441 2.380 .858 
Net lending 
(+)/net 
borrowing (-) 
28 -8.80 1.50 
-
2.9321 
2.49549 -.228 .441 .065 .858 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
28         
Source: Own calculations using SPSS 
Appendix 2. Case Processing Summary 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 
28 82.4 
Dependent Variable 
Encoding 
Missing Cases 
6 17.6 
Original Value 
Internal 
Value 
Total 34 100.0 Under  2.27 0 
Unselected Cases 
0 .0 
 Over 
2.27 
1 
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Total 34 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total 
number of cases. 
Appendix 3. Classification Tablea,b 
Classification Tablea,b 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 Cresterea PIB Percentage 
Correct  mai mic de 2.27 peste 2.27 
Step 0 Cresterea PIB mai mic de 2.27 0 14 .0 
peste 2.27 0 14 100.0 
Overall Percentage   50.0 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
Source: Own calculations using SPSS 
  
